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Corresponding Author:
Andrea Vindigni, DISPI, Department of Political Sciences, University of Genova, Italy

Alberto Alesina (1957-2020): Man, Researcher, Professor of Economics, Popularizer

March 22, 2024
JEL classification: O11; O43
Keywords: Political Economy; Government; Public Debt; Inequality; Economic Growth; Redistribution; Culture

Abstract

This paper offers a short summary of the scientific work of Alberto Alesina. The fundamental contribution of this scholar has been the creation and development of modern political economy, since the first half of eighties. In this paper, I have initially tried to explain what political economy is about, and what today is meant by political economy. I have then focused the attention on one of Alesina’s most important contribution: his 1994 article with Dani Rodrik un distributive politics and economics growth. Thereby, I have briefly illustrated some contributions of other scholars influenced by the aforementioned work, as well as some other articles of Alesina himself. Among the latter ones, I have focused the attention in particular on his contributions to the theory of “fiscal austerity” and to the economic role of “culture” broadly speaking.  


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Institute for International Economics
of the Genoa Chamber of Commerce


Istituto di Economia Internazionale
Camera di Commercio di Genova
Via Garibaldi, 4 (III piano) - 16124 Genova (Italy)
www.ge.camcom.gov.it